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INTRODUCTION
Allan Ides*
A basic tenet of constitutionalism posits that governmental
authority may be exercised only in accord with previously agreed on
principles of superior law. In liberal democracies, that agreement is
entered among the sovereign people. In this fashion, the everyday
exercise of public power is, at least in theory, limited by
democratically established first principles of superior law. Those
principles may involve the structure of government, the ceding of
power to it, and the imposition of limitations on the exercise of that
power. Typically, these first principles may be altered or avoided
only through extraordinary and constitutionally established means.
When we speak of constitutionalism then we speak of the theory of
limits on the exercise of governmental power.
Yet, how does one create a limited government without at the
same time creating a superior authority to enforce those limits? In
the United States and in most liberal democracies, the only superior
authority belongs to the people, who retain the power of
constitutional revision. That rarely exercised power aside, the
primary enforcement of constitutional principle is the practice of
judicial review, a relatively soft mechanism that operates internally
within the bounds of the constitutional system. Given that the
judiciary possesses no independent means to force compliance with
its orders, the effectiveness of judicial review depends largely on the
habit of compliance developed within the political culture. Seen
from this perspective, constitutional law represents as much a
cultural phenomenon as it does a legal regime. Hence, a constitution
functions as superior law because of a tacit agreement that it ought to
be so, and because of a willingness to accept the hard edges of the
otherwise soft practice of judicial review.
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Many often associate the practice of constitutionalism with
domestic law, i.e., with the internal law of the nation state. In part,
this may be because constitutionalism is most likely to take root in a
culture that is reasonably cohesive and amenable to consensus on a
wide array of issues, including the necessity of compliance with
adopted constitutional standards. There is, however, no reason that
the theory and practice of constitutionalism cannot be applied across
national boundaries. But just as domestic constitutionalism depends
on a domestic cultural cohesion that habitually accepts the propriety
and necessity of constitutional compliance, transnational
constitutionalism depends on a similar constitutional culture among
those nations agreeing to the transnational constitutional regime.
This symposium examines some of the benefits and difficulties
confronting the translation of a domestic constitutional dialogue into
a transnational context.
Professor Laurence Helfer's contribution to the symposium,
Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, examines
the potential analogies between domestic constitutionalism and the
international legal system from five different perspectives, each
demonstrating the challenge of attempting to translate the
"decentralized and disaggregated" system of international law into a
cohesive and legitimate transnational constitutional regime. Overall,
he demonstrates how the largely decentralized system of
international law lacks both a centralizing authority, and how it also
lacks an international culture with the habit of what might be called
constitutional obedience and consistency. Further, the exit and
escape components of many international agreements fail to ensure
the permanence typically attributed to a constitutional regime.
Professor Helfer's message is not, however, one of despair for those
who envision a transnational system of constitutional law. Rather, he
offers a realistic appraisal of the challenges facing those who would
seek to discover constitutional principle in the myriad institutions,
practices, and relationships that comprise the system of international
law.
In Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, Professor Mark
Tushnet considers several distinct aspects of our evolving bodies of
transnational and domestic constitutional law, two of which this
Introduction will highlight briefly. First, Professor Tushnet offers a
comparative perspective on the role that other nations' constitutional
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law might play in the creation or development of constitutional law
within the United States. His approach is both descriptive and
critical, advocating a realist view on the use of non-U.S. standards to
inform the pragmatic choices that go into the judicial creation of
domestic constitutional law, though, beyond realism, he also offers a
creative originalist argument for the incorporation of non-U.S. law
into the fabric of our constitutional law. This cross-fertilization
between separate constitutional cultures, which appears to be in
process, may create an important bridge toward the ultimate creation
of a shared, transnational constitutional vision. Second, Professor
Tushnet considers some of the sovereignty concerns that arise when
non-U.S. institutions created by virtue of treaties, such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO), are given the authority to coerce
domestic compliance with the generally phrased but specifically
interpreted provisions of the underlying treaty. He concludes that
such sovereignty concerns fail to recognize the role that domestic
law plays in the enforcement of such orders. Thus, in Professor
Tushnet's view, the domestic constitutional legitimacy of a
transnational institution, such as the WTO, remains firmly premised
on standard domestic constitutional law.
Professor Vicki Jackson's article entitled, Transnational
Discourse, Relational Authority and the U.S. Court: Gender
Equality, presents a detailed examination of the transnational
constitutional discourse on gender equality. Her approach is both
descriptive and normative. As to the latter, she convincingly argues
that this transnational discourse represents a fundamental aspect of
constitutionalism even within the seemingly independent realms of
domestic constitutional law. As she phrases it, "What is different
here is the sense of joint purpose, of being embedded not only in a
community of nations making decisions about similar issues under
similar domestic constitutional instruments but of an overarching
legal order of internationally recognized human rights norms that,
whether or not domestically incorporated, provides reason to strive to
meet the international standard and to be mindful of other
interpretations in doing so." (page 70) She further argues that even
in constitutionally mature cultures, such as the United States, judicial
consideration of non-binding transnational and comparative sources
both contribute both to the content of domestic constitutional law and
to the international development of shared fundamental principles of
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law, particularly in the context of human rights. Thus, according to
Professor Jackson, such materials should not be seen as merely
persuasive authorities to be followed or ignored at will, but as a form
of required "relational" reading that should play an interactive role in
the development of domestic and world-wide constitutional
jurisprudence.
The European Union (EU) is often cited as the quintessential
exemplar of a functioning, supranational institution. Professor Peter
Lindseth's contribution to this symposium, The Contradictions of
Supranationalism: Administrative Governance and
Constitutionalization in European Integration Since the 1950s,
challenges that view. Presenting a historical perspective on European
integration, Professor Lindseth argues that the current status of
European integration is best seen as an instrumentalist extension of
the administrative governance that has developed in Europe at the
national level, and not as the creation of a new and democratically-
legitimized constitutional order. Thus, instead of creating what
might be characterized as a transnational or supranational
constitutional entity, the EU reflects more the collectivist
administrative interests of the member nation-states, each
represented by its own national executive - typically the titular head
of that nation's administrative apparatus. Moreover, according to
Professor Lindseth, while each nation-state is constitutionally
legitimized by its own "demos," the so-called supranational state has,
as of yet, no such identifiable European demos and therefore no
independent constitutional legitimacy. Professor Lindseth does not
deny that the EU exhibits certain elements of constitutionalism - for
example, the work of the European Court of Justice. Rather, he takes
the view that current status of the EU as a supranational institution is
far from complete. In his words, "Although European integration
has clearly involved contradictory elements of both
constitutionalization and administrative governance, my own sense is
that the socio-legal character of the EU tips in favor of the
latter.... ." (page 91) Professor Lindseth's historical perspective
serves as a powerful reminder that the label of constitutionalism must
be grounded in the reality of the system so described and not in some
idealized version of that system.
In Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and The Constitution of
International Markets, Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann presents a
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carefully constructed philosophic and normative argument asserting
that the international constitutionalization of a non-discriminatory
rules-based market is an essential component in the global protection
of human rights. "From a human rights perspective, international
justice refers, above all, to human rights and democratic procedures
that justify the allocation and protection of equal basic rights, and the
distribution of scarce resources necessary for personal self-
development of individuals as morally and rationally autonomous
social human beings." (page 7-8) Moreover, "[a]s human rights
protect individual and democratic diversity, effective protection of
human rights inevitably gives rise to market-based information
mechanisms and coordination mechanisms whose proper functioning
requires national and international constitutional constraints of
'market failures' as well as of 'government failures' in economic
markets no less than in 'political markets."' (page 32) At a
descriptive level, Professor Petersmann sees various international
institutions, including the European Union and the World Trade
Organization, as playing an essential role in this process of
constitutionalizing human rights. With respect to the WTO, for
example, Professor Petersmann observes that "all four categories of
constitutional elements in modem international law" are evident
within the structure of that organization- namely, separation of
powers, supremacy, the creation of substantive rights, and
compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising under it. (pages 37-38)
Having examined the philosophic premise for the constitutional
protection of human rights at an international level, Professor
Petersmann further argues for the need to strengthen the
international, constitutional protection of existential, democratic, and
instrumental human rights beyond that available within the European
Union and through the WTO.
While the contributors to this symposium offer five different
perspectives on the "emerging transnational constitution," some
more sanguine that others, it seems clear that something's happening
here. At the very least, the principles and nomenclature of
constitutionalism have become part of the international dialogue on
human rights, perhaps suggesting that we are potentially in the
middle of a process of significant constitutional change on a
transnational scale. Whether that international culture of constitution-
alism will take root and bear lasting fruit remains to be seen.
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